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1 Introduction
Decision-making within international organizations is sometimes made by voting bodies
that comprise a proper subset of the membership (a ‘‘council’’). The pre-eminent such
council, and the primary motivator of this paper, is the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), the only international body with the power to authorize the use of armed force. At
any one time, the UNSC contains only 15 members from a total United Nations (UN)
membership of 193. Two further councils operating within the UN are the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the United Nations Human Rights Council
(UNHRC). ECOSOC (54 members) is responsible for coordinating the work of 14 UN
specialized agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
while the UNHRC (47 members) is responsible for promoting and protecting human rights
around the world. Councils also operate within many of the UN’s specialized agencies,
some examples being the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(35 members), the Council of the International Maritime Organization (40 members), and
the Executive Board of the World Health Organization (34 members).1
In this paper we develop a simple and sober theoretical framework for analyzing
democratic equitability in councils and present an application to the UNSC. Existing
studies of equity in international voting bodies are predicated on an idealized two-stage
democratic decision-making process—first, each member state holds a national vote;
second, a delegate from each member state votes in the international body according to the
outcome of the national vote. International voting bodies that have been analyzed in this
framework include the Council of the European Union (e.g., Felsenthal and Machover
2001, 2004, 2007; Laruelle and Widgre´n 1998; Leech 2002a); the UN General Assembly
(Manno 1966; Newcombe et al. 1971; Dixon 1983), the IMF Executive Board (Leech
2002b; Leech and Leech 2013; Rapkin and Strand 2006), and the World Bank Executive
Boards (Leech and Leech 2005).2 The UNSC is notably absent from this list.
What lies behind this lacuna? When international decision-making is by a council, the
conventional democratic decision-making process described above cannot be applied
directly for at least two reasons. First, in a council, only a subset of country delegates gets
to participate in the international vote. Second, this subset is not usually constant over time.
We account for these factors in a new class of voting game we term a council voting game
(CVG). In a CVG a body comprising all members—an ‘‘assembly’’—assigns (by election
or otherwise) a subset of its members to a ‘‘council’’. As the council’s membership must be
allowed to change through time we cannot take it to be a primitive, thus distinguishing a
CVG from the classical ‘‘simple voting game’’ of Shapley (1962). In a CVG the set of
council members instead originates endogenously as a function of four primitive elements,
(A, N, R, P), where A is the set of members of the assembly; R is a regional partition on
1 Why do councils exist? In the case of military or emergency action, the lengthy deliberations of a large
body are thought to prevent such a body from being able to react with sufficient speed to developing security
threats. Alternatively, councils may function in domains deemed to require detailed or specialised analysis
(ECOSOC being an example). From a realpolitik perspective, it is also possible that councils are a
mechanism by which countries with greater stakes in the decisions being taken seek to acquire greater
influence. Councils can also arise at the national level. For instance, some countries have ‘‘Privy’’ or
‘‘Executive’’ Councils with the right to enact legislation during states of emergency, committees that
perform detailed tasks such as voting over proposed new legislation on a clause-by-clause basis prior to final
approval by the national legislature, or both.
2 Applications to national legislatures include Miller (2009) and Banzhaf (1968) to the US Electoral
College; and McLean et al. (2005) and Dunleavy (2010) to the UK Parliament.
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A (the UN membership is partitioned into five regions, for instance); N is a partition of
seats on the council between regions, and P is a stochastic process that determines the
probability with which each member of A is assigned to the council.
To analyze equitable representation, we embed a CVG within a democratic decision-
making process. In the conventional two-stage process employed in the literature, the first
(national) vote is held under a simple majority rule, with a binary set of voting possibilities
{for, against}, and a dichotomous outcome space {mandate to vote ‘‘for’’, mandate to vote
‘‘against’’}. In the second (international) stage, countries vote ‘‘for’’ or ‘‘against’’
according to their national mandates and the outcome space is {pass, fail}. We generalize
this process in three ways. First, we posit a tripartite process in which a national vote
occurs in the first stage, countries are assigned randomly to the council in the second stage,
and the council votes in the final stage. Second, we allow for the first stage to be a regional
(rather than national) vote to study a notion of equity at the level of regions, distinct from
equity at the level of countries. Last, in order to represent the distinct role of abstention in
councils such as the UNSC faithfully, we generalize the set of voting possibilities and
outcomes in the national and international votes, and we generalize the decision rule
beyond simple majority rule.3
Our basic normative notion of democratic equity—the equalization of expected voting
power (EVP) criterion—requires that every citizen have the same voting power (in
expectation) over outcomes in the council, before the assignment of countries to the
council is known.4 This concept of equity, therefore, reflects both a country’s voting rights
when serving as a council member, and how often it is a council member.
We distinguish between equity at the country and region levels: the country-level equity
concept presupposes that, when a member of the council, countries represent only their
own citizens, whereas the region-level concept presupposes that, when a council member,
countries act as representatives of their region as a whole. We also develop flavors of the
EVP criterion under different a priori assumptions regarding intra-regional preference
correlation. Interestingly, our country and region equity concepts are not, in general,
mutually compatible: a CVG that is equitable if council members represent only them-
selves (as opposed to their regions) will necessarily fail to achieve equitable regional
representation, and the reverse also is true.
We characterize democratic equitability under each of our equity concepts. Under the
assumption of random voting, we show that our country equity concept is satisfied when a
citizen’s expected absolute voting power in the council (before the assignment of countries
to the council is known) is inversely proportional to their absolute voting power in the
national ballot. Regional equity under random voting requires that a citizen’s absolute
voting power in the council (when each region votes as a bloc) is inversely proportional to
their absolute voting power in the regional ballot.
With respect to applications, our paper is the first we are aware of to present a quan-
titative assessment against formal equity concepts of the equitability of the UNSC for both
individual countries and regions. As we discuss in more detail in Sect. 3, the UNSC is
witnessing a protracted reform debate that centers on national and regional representation
(see, e.g., Franck 2003). At the regional level, reformers argue that Africa and Asia have
3 Thus, we contribute to the growing literature on the theory and application of ternary voting games (see,
e.g., Birkmeier et al. 2011; Braham and Steffen 2002; Coˆrte-Real and Pereira 2004; Felsenthal and
Machover 1997; Freixas 2012; Freixas and Zwicker 2003, 2009; Herrera and Mattozzi 2010; Lindner 2008;
Uleri 2002).
4 We shall use the terms ‘‘equitability’’ and ‘‘equity’’ synonymously throughout.
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too little power, and that a north–south imbalance exists. At the national level, countries
such as Germany and Japan—who are eligible only for Non-Permanent Member (NPM)
status on the UNSC—claim to be severely underrepresented, and the permanent members
(PMs)—who each wield an individual veto—are argued to have too much representation.
Our modeling of the UNSC utilizes a specification of the democratic decision-making
process in which the vote in the first stage is under an extension of the well-known majority
threshold rule to allow for three voting possibilities, {for, abstain, against}, and three
possible outcomes, {mandate to vote for, no mandate, mandate to vote against}. Specifi-
cally, a threshold proportion of the eligible voters must vote for (against) a motion for a
country to have a mandate to vote for (against) a motion in the council. Abstention in the
council is identified with instances wherein a country fails to obtain a mandate for voting
either for or against a motion in the national vote. We prove an extension of Penrose’s
(1946) square-root law for the case in which the majority threshold is set at one-third of
eligible voters.
Our findings give detailed insights into the UNSC reform debate. Our main notion of
country equity shows that the permanent members (PMs) are heavily overrepresented: the
United Kingdom is the most heavily overrepresented PM with over 21 times its
equitable level of expected voting power, while China is the least heavily overrepresented
PM with around 3.8 times its equitable level of expected voting power. Our equity con-
cepts do not, however, preclude some countries holding a right of veto. The very smallest
countries in terms of population suffer from very significant underrepresentation—Do-
minica, for instance, is estimated to receive just 0.8 % of its equitable voting power. Our
regional equity concept shows that Africa is the most underrepresented region with only
around one-third of its equitable voting power, while Eastern Europe is the most over-
represented with just over double its equitable representation. These findings suggest a case
for a reallocation of the seats given to each region, and our notion of country equity is
prescriptive in this regard.
The plan of the rest of paper is as follows: Sect. 2 develops a theoretical framework for
the analysis of democratic equity in councils; Sect. 3 presents an application of the theory
to the UNSC; and Sect. 4 concludes. All proofs are located in the Appendix.
2 Theory
In this section we consider a setting in which an ‘‘assembly’’ assigns a subset of its
members to a ‘‘council’’. As with other aspects of the model, this setting is intended to
mirror the UN’s observed structure, in which context the assembly should be thought of as
the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main deliberative body of the UN containing all
193 of its members, and the council could refer to any of the councils within the UN
identified in the Introduction. As in the UNGA, we partition the assembly’s membership
into regional groups. Countries are then assigned to the council in fixed numbers from each
of the regions.
Alternative interpretations of these elements of the model are possible, however. For
instance, the assembly could be a national legislature partitioned along party-political
(rather than geographic) lines, and the council a cross-party committee of the legislature.
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2.1 Council voting games
In this section we develop formally a class of voting games we term a council voting game
(CVG). We begin by describing the elements of a CVG.
Let the assembly (comprising all members) be denoted as the finite set A. We partition A
into regions by writing A = [j Rj, where Rj is the jth region, j [ J. The set of all regions,
Rj
 
j2J , we denote by R. Each region is a set of countries; we define aij as the ith country
within region j.
The number of council seats for the members of each region j is given by nj C 1, where
it is assumed that the number of seats for each region is always smaller than the number of
countries belonging to the region, |Rj|[ nj. The set nj
 
j2J we denote N.
Rather than specify the procedure by which countries are assigned to the council, we
adopt a reduced form representation that allows for any such procedure. An assignment
process P is a stochastic process that induces, for every motion k on which the council
must vote, a probability pijk that country aij is assigned to the council for that vote. Under
P, the average assignment probability of country aij on an infinite set of motions k [ K is
given by pij ¼ EK pijk
 
.
The above elements together determine the set of council members, M, voting on a
given motion. Hence, we write M : M(A, N, R, P). The realized set of council members
voting on motion k is signified by Mk, and we denote by Mjk the intersection Mk \ Rj.
Votes in the council are decided according to a decision rule U, which is a mapping
from the space of voting possibilities to an outcome space, satisfying the monotonicity
conditions given in Freixas and Zwicker (2003).5 We may now define a CVG:
Definition 1 A council voting game is the pair C = {M, U}.
2.2 Equity in CVGs
2.2.1 The democratic decision-making process
To understand the equity properties of a CVG, it must be embedded in a democratic
decision-making process that maps the preferences of citizens to outcomes. To analyze
differing country and regional notions of equity, we introduce two such decision-making
processes: the ‘‘country’’ process (CDP) and the ‘‘region’’ process (RDP). Under the CDP
countries on the council represent only their national populations, allowing us to investi-
gate equity at the country level. Under the regional process (RDP), countries are assumed a
priori to act on the council as regional representatives, permitting us to investigate equity at
that level.
For a given motion k, the CDP comprises three stages. In stage 1, a national ballot is
held in each country. The decision rule in stage 1 is taken to be anonymous, such that every
citizen of a country has symmetric voting rights. In stage 2, a subset Mjk , Rj of countries
are assigned to the council from each region. In stage 3, countries aij [ Mk vote in the
council according to the outcome of their national ballot in stage 1. In contrast, in the RDP,
a single regional ballot is held in each region in stage 1 under an anonymous decision rule,
such that every citizen of a region has symmetric voting rights. In stage 2 a subset Mjk, Rj
of countries are assigned to the council from each region. In stage 3, countries aij [ Mjk
5 In particular, application of the decision rule identifies uniquely the set of winning coalitions.
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vote as a bloc, each bloc member voting according to the outcome of the regional ballot in
stage 1.6
2.2.2 Equity concepts
Our basic normative notion of democratic equity is that, from behind a veil of ignorance as
to what a citizen’s preference is, and to which country or region they belong, a citizen
should be able to influence outcomes in the council equally. This criterion is often referred
to as the ‘‘one-person, one-vote’’ criterion, or the ‘‘equalization of voting power’’ criterion
(for brevity, the EVP criterion). Crucially, we require that the EVP criterion hold before
the assignment of countries to the council occurs. That is, we require that expected voting
power (before it is known which countries will vote in stage 3) to be equal across citizens.
This notion of equity acknowledges that the democratic power of a citizen in a global
council depends not only on the voting rights of his or her country when it is a member of
the council, but also on how frequently his or her country is a member of the council.7
We posit two related forms of the EVP criterion. In its strong form, we require that the
EVP criterion hold for each and every motion. This implies, for instance, that a country
with a smaller assignment probability on a given motion must, by way of compensation,
receive more voting power on the council if it is assigned.8
The weak form of the EVP criterion, however, allows for deviations from the EVP
criterion on any one ballot, so long as deviations offset across an infinite sequence of
ballots. Intuitively, the weak form permits intertemporal shifting of assignment probabil-
ities and voting rights: a country might, for instance, have guaranteed representation on the
council in a given period in return for a lesser assignment probability in other periods.
Under weak EVP, a country with a smaller average assignment probability must be
compensated for longer expected spells outside the council by the exercise of greater
voting power when it is a member of the council.
Two variants of country equity are therefore possible—one under the strong form of the
EVP criterion (CEs), and one under the weak form (CEw). In many contexts, the question
of whether a CVG is equitable on average over time is of primary interest. Accordingly, in
the application we shall mainly employ the weak form of EVP. At minimum, however, the
strong form can be used as a ‘‘tie-breaker’’ to choose between CVGs that stalemate with
respect to weak EVP.
In contrast, when considering regional equity no meaningful distinction exists between
evaluating the EVP criterion for every motion or across an infinite sequence of motions.
This is so because each region always is represented on the council, and the identities of
6 As, in the context of regional equity, we are interested specifically in understanding the representation of
regions as cohesive entities it is appropriate in this context to disregard the possibility—which might be very
real in practice—that countries assigned to the council in stage 2 of the RDP might break ranks and vote
according to the preference of their own citizens rather than according to the outcome of the regional ballot.
This point underscores the need to understand both country and regional concepts of equity.
7 Several of the proposals for reforming the UNSC detailed in Cox (2009) modify only the assignment
probabilities, leaving voting rights unchanged. This suggests that world leaders understand (at least intu-
itively) the importance of assignment probabilities distinct from voting rights.
8 Our notion of country equity is procedurally equitable, but is compatible with individual countries
experiencing short-term gluts and droughts of membership owing to the stochastic nature of the assignment
process. That is, we consider ‘‘procedural’’ equity, rather than ‘‘outcome’’ equity (see, e.g., De Cremer et al.
2010). This distinction is analogous to that made by scholars of law between ‘‘procedural’’ and ‘‘distribu-
tive’’ justice (e.g., Konovsky 2000); and by economists between ‘‘static’’ and ‘‘dynamic’’ equity (e.g., Rose
and Stevens 1998).
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the countries that form the regional bloc are immaterial. Accordingly, only one notion of
regional equity must be considered, which we denote by RE.
2.2.3 Equity concepts—a formalization
We denote the population of country aij as qij [ N, and the population of region j as
qj ¼
P
aij2Rj qij. We denote the absolute voting power of a citizen of country aij in stage 1
under the CDP (RDP) as uCDPij u
RDP
j
 
. Similarly, absolute voting power in stage 3 is
denoted for country aij under the CDP (RDP) as xCDPij x
RDP
j
 
.9 Candidate specifications
for u and x are given in, e.g., Freixas (2005a, b), but at this stage we need not specify a
particular index of absolute voting power.
Under the CDP, we denote the overall (or composite) voting power of a citizen of
country aij (before it is known whether aij will be assigned to the council to vote on motion
k) by vCEsijk , and the expectation of v
CEs
ijk over k [ K is denoted v
CEw
ij . Under the RDP, we
denote the composite voting power of a citizen of region j by vREj .
Definition 2 below formalizes our three perspectives on the EVP criterion. Equality
across countries/regions of the relevant notion of composite voting power is expressed
mathematically as the requirement that all individual country/regional deviations from the
Assembly mean, EA ð Þ, be zero. This approach shall provide a natural metric for measuring
deviations from each equity concept for the purposes of application.
Definition 2
(i) C satisfies CEs if vCEsijk ¼ EA vCEsijk
 
for all aij and all k [ K;
(ii) C satisfies CEw if vCEwij ¼ EA vCEwij
 
for all aij;
(iii) C satisfies RE if vREj ¼ EA vREj
 
for all aij .
We begin by analyzing Definition 2 under the assumption—termed uncorrelated pref-
erences (UC)—that every world citizen votes independently, and is equally likely to vote
for each of the given voting possibilities. UC is not understood as denying the possibility of
preference correlation in this context, but instead harks to Bernoulli’s Principle of Insuf-
ficient Reason (BPIR), according to which voting alternatives should be assigned equal
epistemic probabilities if there is no known reason for assigning unequal ones (see, e.g.,
Felsenthal and Machover 1997, 2003).10 An analysis under UC preferences captures the
inequity that is inherent in the rules of a CVG, which is logically distinct from the actual,
or empirical, level of inequity that might be observed at a point in time. Given the shifting
sands of political ties over time, strong arguments exist for considering this concept of
9 Note that, under the CDP, a country’s absolute voting power on the council, xCDPij , is motion-invariant, yet
its relative voting power, xCDPij =
P
aij2Mk x
CDP
ij , may vary from motion to motion. A similar point also applies
to regional blocs under the RDP. In the UNSC, however, both absolute and relative voting power are
motion-invariant (for countries and regions), but only because the rules of this particular council imply that a
non-PM always is replaced by another such member from the same region with identical voting rights.
10 Indeed, were preferences actually uncorrelated within countries and regions, then these concepts would
be almost arbitrary and we would not witness the fierce debates over regional and national representation
that we indeed observe in the UNSC reform debate.
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inherent, rather than empirical, inequity. Accordingly, we make UC preferences our
benchmark assumption. As we shall discuss below, however, the assertion of BPIR may
not be appropriate in all contexts, so we will examine later the implications of Definition 2
when allowing a priori for degrees of preference correlation.
For UC preferences it is straightforward to deduce that
vCEsijk ¼ uCDPij pijkxCDPij ; vCEwij ¼ uCDPij pijxCDPij ; vREj ¼ uRDPj xRDPj ;
which gives rise to our first Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under UC preferences, C satisfies
(i) CEs if and only if xCDPij / 1pijkuCDPij for all aij and all k [ K;
(ii) CEw if and only if xCDPij / 1pijuCDPij for all aij;
(iii) RE if and only if xRDPj / 1uRDP
j
for all j.
According to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1, country equity does not relate exclu-
sively to the properties of the decision rule U, but rather is a property of the interaction
between U and the (stochastic) assignment process P. According to part (i), to meet the
EVP criterion in its strong form it must hold that, for every motion, expected voting power
on the council is assigned in inverse proportion to a citizen’s expected voting power across
stages 1 and 2 of the CDP. Many divisions of voting power and assignment probability that
achieve strong EVP are possible: if the pijk are equal across countries (a flat rule) then
strong EVP holds if voting power in the council is proportional to 1
.
uCDPij . An alternative
possibility is that voting power in the council obeys a flat rule, and the assignment
probabilities are proportional to 1
.
uCDPij .
11
In its weak form, country EVP requires an understanding of the long-run properties of
the assignment process, as summarized by pij—the average assignment probability of
country aij. Weak country EVP is met if, on average, expected voting power on the council
is assigned in inverse proportion to a citizen’s long-run expected voting power across
stages 1 and 2.
It is straightforward to observe that if the pijk are made invariant with respect to k, then
pijk ¼ pij holds for all k [ K, such that strong country EVP coincides with weak country
EVP. In all other cases, however, the two concepts are distinct; strong country EVP implies
weak country EVP, but the reverse implication does not hold.
Last, part (iii) of the proposition establishes the following: regional equity requires that
the voting power of regional bloc j on the council must be inversely proportional to the
voting power of a citizen of region j in stage 1. Assignment probabilities do not play a role
here because each region always is represented on the council.
Are region and country equity mutually compatible? A complex relationship exists
between the voting power of a bloc and the sum of the voting powers of its individual
members when voting independently (see, e.g., Leech and Leech 2006). In general, this
relationship is non-linear (and so also non-additive), yet compatibility of regional and
11 Both of these examples are monotonic in the sense that more populous countries receive weakly larger
absolute voting power and assignment probability. We note, however, that CEs also is satisfied by a range of
less empirically plausible rules in which, e.g., assignment probability is declining in population and voting
power is a function of population that rises faster than 1
.
uCDPij .
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country equity requires a proportional relationship to hold between the two. While arte-
factual examples can be constructed with this property, the probability of such a rela-
tionship happening to hold, by chance, in an empirical example seems remote.
Accordingly, under UC preferences, country and regional equity are, for practical pur-
poses, incompatible.
2.3 Correlated preferences
Reasons sometimes exist for supposing preference correlation at the country/region level,
in which case it is inappropriate to invoke BPIR. In the context of a cross-party committee,
for instance, voting down party lines may be anticipated a priori.12 We therefore outline
two alternative possible configurations of citizen preferences. We stress, however, that the
most appropriate configuration of preferences must be judged on a case-by-case basis
depending on the council to which the theoretical model is being applied.
The first alternative, Region Correlation (RC), is the extreme case (relative to UC) in
which all citizens of region j have identical preferences, such that (i) voting is perfectly
correlated across citizens within a country; and (ii) country voting outcomes are perfectly
correlated across countries within a region. On a given motion, however, each voting
possibility is equally likely to be the one chosen unanimously by all regional citizens, so
voting outcomes between regions remain independent. Accordingly, under RC preferences,
countries within each region vote as regional blocs on the council, but each bloc votes
independently. As this outcome holds under both decision-making processes we consider,
no meaningful distinction between country and regional equity arises in this case. Thus we
may restrict attention to regional equity.
With RC preferences, every world citizen is a dictator in the stage 1 regional vote, in the
standard sense that the outcome of the vote always coincides with his/her preferred out-
come. A minimal property of all voting power indices of which we know is that a dictator
receives the maximal voting power, which we denote by u[ 0. Thus, we may write:
vREj ¼ uxRDPj .
A second configuration, Country Correlation (CC), constitutes an intermediate case in
which all citizens of country i have identical preferences, but preferences are independent
across countries. With CC preferences every world citizen is again a dictator in the national
(stage 1) vote under the CDP; we thus obtain vCEsijk ¼ upijkxCDPij and vCEwij ¼ upijxCDPij .
Citizens are not dictators in stage 1 under the RDP, however, so, as under UC preferences,
we obtain vREj ¼ uRDPj xRDPj . Noting that u simply can be subsumed into the constant of
proportionality we obtain:
Proposition 2 Under CC preferences C satisfies
(i) CEsif and only if xCDPij / 1=pijk for all aijand all k [ K; and CEwif and only if
xCDPij / 1=pij for all aij;
(ii) RE if and only if xRDPj / 1=uRDPj for all j;
and under RC preferences C satisfies
(iii) RE if and only if xRDPj is equal for all j.
12 More generally, whenever the partition between regions and/or countries involves some degree of self-
selection, as opposed to exogenous assignment, an a priori expectation of some degree of preference
correlation might be posited.
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3 Application
In this section we apply the theory of Sect. 2 to the case of the UNSC, the most powerful
organ within the UN. The UNSC has the authority to make legally binding resolutions in
fulfillment of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. To that end, it can
suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, impose blockades, and
authorize the use of armed force. Under the present arrangements—which have been in
place since 1965—the UNSC is comprised of 15 members, of which five—China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are ever-present and wield a veto on
all non-procedural matters. The remaining ten non-permanent members are elected by the
UNGA and serve time-limited two-year terms.
The UNSC is experiencing a protracted reform debate, in which both country and
regional perspectives on equity are cited frequently (e.g., Russett et al. 1996; Hammer
2002; Schwartzberg 2003; Annan 2005; Blum 2005). From the country perspective, it is
argued commonly that the veto rights of the five PMs gives these countries too much
influence. Nearly all governments wish to abolish or limit the right of veto, which is
viewed as an unfair and anachronistic legacy of the Second World War (Fassbender 2004;
Schwartzberg 2003).
From the regional perspective, it is argued that Africa and Asia are underrepresented as
together they account for around 75 % of the populations of UNGA member countries, but
are allocated only 20 % of the PM seats, and 50 % of the NPM seats, and, moreover, that
an even larger representational imbalance exists between the developed north and the
developing south.
In the absence of a formal theoretical framework for assessing the equitability of CVGs,
or for addressing issues relating to regional- and country-specific notions of equity,
existing quantitative analyses of equity in the UNSC are unable to verify these claims
directly. Instead, extant studies use the voting power of a PM relative to a NPM as an
informal indicator of equitability (see, e.g., Hosli et al. 2011; O’Neill 1996; Strand and
Rapkin 2011; Straffin 1993, p. 180). The theoretical framework of Sect. 2 permits, for the
first time, a formal quantitative assessment of the equitability of the UNSC for both
individual countries and regions. The benchmark analysis is performed for UC preferences,
although we shall comment briefly on the implications of assuming CC preferences.
Are our democratic notions of equity appropriate for a body such as the UNSC? After
all, different countries make very different per capita contributions to peacekeeping and
international disaster relief.13 There are, however, strong arguments for operating inter-
national organizations along democratic lines relating, in particular, to the need for such
organizations to be seen as legitimate (Frey and Stutzer 2006; Stutzer and Frey 2006;
Marchetti 2008; Cowling et al. 2010). Also, to our knowledge, an alternative equity notion
with the philosophical clarity and widespread normative acceptability of the democratic
notion of one person, one vote, is yet to be proposed. Last, as we comment further in the
conclusion, even if implementation of the democratic equity concepts discussed here
would violate implicit realpolitik constraints, these concepts still stand as benchmarks for
identifying the optimal second-best choice from among the set of CVGs that satisfy such
constraints.
13 As of 2014, the United States contributes 22 % of the UN’s regular budget, Japan contributes 10.8 %,
and Germany 7.1 %, whereas the combined contributions of African nations sum to only 1.2 % (UN
Secretariat 2013). Contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping budget are even more skewed towards developed
countries.
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3.1 Modeling the UNSC
We consider the UNSC as of 2012; the corresponding CVG we denote by C2012UNSC. We now
describe each of the elements (A, N, R, P, U) for this game. The assembly A is the UNGA,
which is partitioned into five regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe (EE), the Latin America
and Caribbean Group (GRULAC—el Grupo Latinoamericano y Cariben˜o), and the
Western European and Others Group (WEOG).14 The ten NPM seats are divided between
the five regions: one for EE; two for each of Asia, the GRULAC and the WEOG; and three
for Africa.
3.1.1 The UNSC assignment process
Let PM be the set of PMs and OM be the set of the remaining 188 ‘‘ordinary’’ members.
For simplicity, we imagine that the UNSC votes once per year—an assumption that is
inconsequential to our findings, but that allows us to interpret naturally the index of
motions, k, as an index of time (as motions are indexed in the same way as years). As a PM
is guaranteed a seat on the UNSC, we have pijk = 1 for aij [ PM. We model the UNSC
assignment process for ordinary members by first giving each aij [ OM a probability, qij [
[0,1] (where
P
aij2Rj qij ¼ 1), with which it will be assigned to the UNSC if (i) it competes
with all other members of its region; and (ii) only a single seat is being assigned.
We construct empirical estimates of the qij from the analysis of Dreher et al. (2014),
which estimates empirically the determinants of election to the UNSC as a NPM,
accounting for the two-stage process by which such members presently are elected.15
These authors show that three country characteristics systematically predict UNSC elec-
tion: population, gross national income per capita, and waiting time since last serving on
the UNSC. The estimated coefficients for these three variables can be used in a straight-
forward way to compute estimates of the qij.
16 The resulting estimates are shown in
Table 1.
To generate the pijk we feed the empirical estimates of the qij into a computer simulation
of the UNSC election process over a set K0 spanning 100,000 simulated years. The precise
details of the simulation will not be of interest to all readers, so these are relegated to the
Appendix. As we discuss below, the set of pijk we obtain in this way are used to estimate
the proximity of the UNSC to strong country EVP, and the obtained estimates of the pij
(see Table 1) are used to estimate the proximity of the UNSC to weak country EVP.
14 See Table 1 for the full membership of each of the regional groups (excluding PMs). Of the PMs, China
is a member in Asia, Russia in EE, and France and the United Kingdom in the WEOG. Technically, the
United States is not a member of any regional group, but it attends meetings of the WEOG as an observer
and is considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes (UN 2012). For the purposes of this
paper, therefore, we give the United States membership in the WEOG.
15 In the first stage, the regions make nominations to the UNGA and, in the second stage, the UNGA votes.
See Dreher et al. (2014) for a detailed account of the election process.
16 Because the Dreher et al. dataset ends in 2006, we obtain estimates of country populations and gross
national incomes per capita (current USD) for 2012 from the CIA World Factbook (see https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html#). We update Dreher et al.’s variable measuring waiting
time since last serving on the UNSC to 2012 using historical membership data from the UNSC Web site
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc). To produce the estimates in Table 1, these data, along with the coefficient
values for population, gross national income per capita, and waiting time since last serving on the UNSC
reported in their Table 3a, are fed into their Eq. (5), where we assume that the sum in the denominator is
over all countries in the region (i.e., their ‘‘Ejt’’—the set of countries competing for the seat—is assumed to
be Rjt).
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Table 1 Estimated (q
ij
, pij) qij pij
Africa
Algeria 0.0860 0.21008
Morocco 0.0501 0.14208
Nigeria 0.0497 0.13907
Egypt 0.0424 0.12154
Ghana 0.0384 0.11102
Tunisia 0.0377 0.11090
United Republic of Tanzania 0.0376 0.10926
South Africa 0.0336 0.10050
Zimbabwe 0.0329 0.09992
Zambia 0.0322 0.09598
Mozambique 0.0319 0.09548
Kenya 0.0319 0.09436
Senegal 0.0309 0.09200
Mali 0.0245 0.07654
Niger 0.0226 0.06948
Cote d’Ivoire 0.0220 0.06816
Guinea 0.0218 0.06788
Congo 0.0218 0.06742
Ethiopia 0.0213 0.06704
Angola 0.0198 0.06180
Libya 0.0189 0.06026
Uganda 0.0184 0.05822
Burkina Faso 0.0173 0.05374
Malawi 0.0172 0.05372
Madagascar 0.0170 0.05324
Mauritania 0.0163 0.05316
Sudan 0.0159 0.05080
Togo 0.0150 0.04828
Gabon 0.0147 0.04704
Benin 0.0136 0.04424
Namibia 0.0124 0.04001
Mauritius 0.0121 0.03802
Cameroon 0.0104 0.03312
South Sudan 0.0098 0.03206
Botswana 0.0097 0.02964
Sierra Leone 0.0087 0.02920
Lesotho 0.0087 0.02830
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.0082 0.02516
Eritrea 0.0072 0.02394
Djibouti 0.0071 0.02308
Gambia 0.0062 0.02110
Central African Republic 0.0061 0.02070
Burundi 0.0059 0.01860
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Table 1 continued
qij pij
Rwanda 0.0055 0.01756
Swaziland 0.0050 0.01590
Somalia 0.0048 0.01560
Cape Verde 0.0045 0.01454
Comoros 0.0030 0.01058
Chad 0.0029 0.01038
Guinea-Bissau 0.0024 0.00886
Liberia 0.0023 0.00744
Sao Tome and Principe 0.0019 0.00694
Equatorial Guinea 0.0012 0.00458
Seychelles 0.0005 0.00148
Asia
India 0.47728 0.51706
Japan 0.12114 0.28257
Pakistan 0.09212 0.23894
Malaysia 0.04707 0.13667
Republic of Korea 0.04376 0.12900
Indonesia 0.03583 0.10664
Bangladesh 0.02381 0.07358
Singapore 0.01899 0.05942
Thailand 0.01732 0.05458
Jordan 0.01521 0.05002
Philippines 0.01487 0.04852
United Arab Emirates 0.01314 0.04120
Sri Lanka 0.01113 0.03650
Iran 0.00657 0.02182
Saudi Arabia 0.00630 0.02040
Kuwait 0.00579 0.01916
Myanmar 0.00518 0.01714
Nepal 0.00516 0.01670
Qatar 0.00462 0.01560
Yemen 0.00414 0.01296
Iraq 0.00332 0.01102
Vietnam 0.00324 0.01102
Oman 0.00323 0.01024
Kazakhstan 0.00257 0.00884
Fiji 0.00203 0.00712
Cyprus 0.00200 0.00696
Papua New Guinea 0.00196 0.00666
Syrian Arab Republic 0.00168 0.00544
Bahrain 0.00149 0.00510
Uzbekistan 0.00148 0.00420
Brunei 0.00092 0.00310
Lebanon 0.00082 0.00262
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Table 1 continued
qij pij
DPR Korea 0.00076 0.00248
Afghanistan 0.00075 0.00240
Cambodia 0.00062 0.00236
Turkmenistan 0.00060 0.00200
Mongolia 0.00048 0.00172
Tajikistan 0.00044 0.00138
Kyrgyzstan 0.00042 0.00122
Laos 0.00040 0.00118
Bhutan 0.00033 0.00106
Maldives 0.00022 0.00076
Solomon Islands 0.00022 0.00076
Timor Leste 0.00018 0.00046
Tonga 0.00008 0.00028
Kiribati 0.00007 0.00024
Vanuatu 0.00007 0.00022
Samoa 0.00005 0.00018
Micronesia (Federeated States of) 0.00003 0.00016
Nauru 0.00002 0.00012
Marshall Islands 0.00002 0.00010
Tuvalu 0.00002 0.00006
Palau 0.00002 0.00006
EE
Poland 0.3681 0.29800
Ukraine 0.2470 0.23984
Romania 0.1122 0.12666
Hungary 0.0591 0.06883
Czech Republic 0.0525 0.06436
Belarus 0.0256 0.03156
Serbia 0.0227 0.02902
Bulgaria 0.0191 0.02282
Azerbaijan 0.0178 0.02243
Slovakia 0.0145 0.01816
Croatia 0.0112 0.01412
Republic of Moldova 0.0078 0.00980
Georgia 0.0074 0.00940
Albania 0.0062 0.00804
Lithuania 0.0060 0.00772
Slovenia 0.0052 0.00664
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0047 0.00594
Latvia 0.0037 0.00462
TFYR Macedonia 0.0034 0.00434
Armenia 0.0034 0.00420
Estonia 0.0019 0.00262
Montenegro 0.0005 0.00088
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Table 1 continued
qij pij
GRULAC
Brazil 0.34235 0.46438
Mexico 0.19389 0.36558
Venezuela 0.16637 0.33693
Argentina 0.08081 0.20360
Colombia 0.04673 0.12944
Chile 0.04251 0.11812
Peru 0.02556 0.07396
Ecuador 0.01801 0.05282
Uruguay 0.01334 0.03926
Cuba 0.01019 0.03174
Dominican Republic 0.00765 0.02328
Honduras 0.00712 0.02162
Costa Rica 0.00605 0.01864
Guatemala 0.00538 0.01729
Panama 0.00484 0.01478
Trinidad and Tobago 0.00458 0.01440
Guyana 0.00415 0.01280
Paraguay 0.00409 0.01192
Jamaica 0.00381 0.01142
Nicaragua 0.00371 0.01098
Bolivia 0.00340 0.01024
El Salvador 0.00165 0.00510
Bahamas 0.00149 0.00484
Belize 0.00070 0.00206
Suriname 0.00061 0.00160
Barbados 0.00046 0.00108
Haiti 0.00020 0.00082
Antigua and Barbuda 0.00015 0.00058
Saint Lucia 0.00013 0.00048
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.00002 0.00012
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.00002 0.00006
Grenada 0.00001 0.00004
Dominica 0.00001 0.00002
WEOG
Germany 0.28949 0.40439
Turkey 0.16346 0.30002
Italy 0.11347 0.23468
Spain 0.07454 0.16795
Austria 0.07041 0.16302
Netherlands 0.04505 0.10772
Canada 0.03614 0.09062
Sweden 0.03072 0.07792
Switzerland 0.02616 0.06536
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3.1.2 The UNSC decision rule
The set of voting possibilities in the UNSC is given by {for, abstain, against} and the
outcome space by {pass, fail}. The UN Charter states that decisions over non-procedural
matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine or more members, including the con-
curring votes of the PMs. A ‘‘concurring’’ vote has come to be understood, in practice, as
either an affirmative vote or an abstention (e.g., Blum 2005), so a negative vote by a PM is
distinct from an abstention. As commented by Felsenthal and Machover (1997, p. 348), this
feature implies that the UNSC’s decision rule ‘‘cannot be faithfully represented’’ as a
binary one.17 This observation notwithstanding, the existing studies of equity in the UNSC
cited previously, as well as other precursors in the literature (e.g., Shapley and Shubik
1954; Straffin 1983), model the UNSC’s decision rule as binary.
We concur with Felsenthal and Machover that the distinct effects of abstention in the
UNSC warrant a decision rule in stage 1 that is consistent with a non-zero level of
abstention in stage 3.18 This we now develop.
3.2 Stage 1 decision rule
To allow for abstention in the UNSC, we consider a voting game for stage 1 in which the
set of voting possibilities is {for, abstain, against} and the outcome space is {mandate to
Table 1 continued
Estimates computed from
Table 3a of Dreher et al. (2014).
Countries are listed in descending
order of qij within each region
qij pij
Ireland 0.02483 0.06198
Denmark 0.02285 0.05798
Belgium 0.02184 0.05574
Finland 0.01849 0.04794
Portugal 0.01692 0.04348
Norway 0.01666 0.04302
Australia 0.01228 0.03320
New Zealand 0.01027 0.02716
Greece 0.00497 0.01398
Israel 0.00054 0.00166
Malta 0.00039 0.00100
Luxembourg 0.00025 0.00070
Iceland 0.00007 0.00012
Monaco 0.00007 0.00012
Andorra 0.00005 0.00012
San Marino 0.00004 0.00008
Liechtenstein 0.00003 0.00004
17 The same point is also made in Freixas and Zwicker (2003).
18 In the existing literature, the stage 1 vote is modelled as a (2,2) simple voting game under a simple
majority decision rule, i.e., two voting possibilities, two outcomes, a mandate to vote ‘‘for’’ in stage 3 arises
if more than half the votes are cast in favor of the motion, and a mandate to vote ‘‘against’’ in stage 3 arises
otherwise. Under this implementation, a country always enters the council with a mandate to vote either
‘‘for’’ or ‘‘against’’ and would therefore never abstain.
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vote ‘‘for’’ on the council (mandate for), no mandate, mandate to vote ‘‘against’’ on the
council (mandate against)}. In the event that ‘‘no mandate’’ obtains, the country (or
regional bloc under the RDP) is assumed to abstain in the council.
Several countries we know of, such as Belarus, Denmark, Germany and Hungary,
employ rules for referendums that contain a majority threshold provision according to
which, for a motion to pass, a minimum threshold of citizens must vote strictly in favor
(Coˆrte-Real and Pereira 2004).19 We therefore employ a Trichotomous Majority Threshold
(TMT) decision rule, which extends this basic principle. Under the TMT rule, there exists a
threshold s [ [0,1] such that for ‘‘mandate for’’ to obtain, (i) more citizens must vote ‘‘for’’
than vote ‘‘against’’; and (ii) at least a proportion s of all eligible voters must vote ‘‘for’’.
For ‘‘mandate against’’ to obtain, (i) more citizens must vote ‘‘against’’ than vote ‘‘for’’;
and (ii) at least a proportion s of all eligible voters must vote ‘‘against’’. In all other
eventualities, ‘‘no mandate’’ obtains. How we specify the threshold parameter s shall be
explained shortly.
3.3 Absolute voting power
The stage 1 vote corresponds to a (3, 3) simple voting game in the sense of Freixas and
Zwicker (2003).20 Accordingly, absolute voting power in stage 1, u, is measured using the
‘‘Banzhaf measure for (j, k) simple voting games’’ given in Definition 3.4 of Freixas
(2005a).21
To compute u under the TMT decision rule (for UC preferences) requires an under-
standing of its asymptotic properties with respect to the size of the electorate. For a given s
and electorate of size q, we write uij = (q; s). Direct evaluation of u(q; s) for a country
such as China (for which q exceeds one billion) is computationally infeasible, however.
Some special values of s do, however, permit simplification; for instance, Lindner (2008,
Corollary 4.1) gives u(q; 0) ?
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
3=p
p 
1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
q
p 
as q ? ? under UC preferences. When
s = 0, however, the ‘‘no mandate’’ outcome arises with measure zero.22 To observe the
‘‘no mandate’’ outcome, we therefore prove a related result for u(q; 1/3).
Proposition 3 Under UC preferences and s = 1/3, the absolute voting power of a citizen
in stage 1, for an electorate of size q, satisfies
19 Other countries, notably Italy, implement a similar rule that requires a quorum for the number of people
that vote (rather than not voting), instead of a condition on the number of citizens voting in favor. We do not
consider this rule, however, for it is well known that it violates the monotonicity requirement of (j,k) simple
voting games (see, e.g., Coˆrte-Real and Pereira 2004; Freixas and Zwicker 2003, 2009; Herrera and Mat-
tozzi 2010; Uleri 2002). Freixas and Zwicker (2009) offer a ‘‘soft quorum’’ rule that avoids this difficulty,
but we know of no examples in which it is used in practice.
20 In this terminology, (3,3) signifies three voting possibilities, and three possible outcomes.
21 In particular, we proceed under what Freixas (2005a) terms the ‘‘uniform numeric evaluation’’. This
appears to be the most appropriate choice in this setting, since the author notes (p. 58) that his Banzhaf
measure coincides with ‘‘the probability that in a randomly chosen j-partition citizen i will be in a position to
change the outcome by altering his/her vote’’.
22 Lindner’s result is seen by setting t = 1/3, wk = 1 for all k and wa = 1 in her Eq. (31), then taking the
limit N ? ?.
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Proposition 3 states that, as q ? ?, the absolute voting power of a citizen in stage 1 is
inversely proportional to
ﬃﬃﬃ
q
p
. Thus, our result may be interpreted as an extension of
Penrose’s (1946) original square-root law for the case in which both the set of voting
possibilities and the set of voting outcomes are binary.
The vote in stage 3 corresponds to a (3, 2) simple voting game. Under the CDP, s = 1/3
implies that countries will vote ‘‘for’’ and ‘‘against’’ with an equal probability, given by
5/12 & 0.42. The probability that a country will wish to abstain is therefore 1/6 & 0.17.
Thus, as seems realistic, abstention is chosen less often than either of the remaining voting
possibilities. Under the RDP, regional blocs vote according to these same probabilities.
As the Banzhaf measure of Freixas (2005a) assumes equal probabilities, it cannot be
applied to stage 3, however. Instead we employ the ‘‘generalized Bz measure’’ of Lindner
(2008), which applies only to (3, 2) simple voting games, but which allows for the
(common) probability of voting ‘‘for’’ or ‘‘against’’ to differ from the probability of voting
‘‘abstain’’. On the class of (3,2) games, Lindner’s measure collapses to that of Freixas
when every voting possibility is assigned the same probability.23
We write xCDPij ¼ xPM for aij [ PM and xCDPij ¼ xOM for aij [ OM. We compute
xOM;xPMf g using the method of generating functions (see, e.g., Freixas 2012). We obtain
xPM & 0.0458 and xOM & 0.0139, implying that a PM receives some 3.3 times more
voting power than a NPM.24 The bloc voting powers are computed similarly as
xRDPAfrica = x
RDP
GRULAC & 0.05, x
RDP
Asia = x
RDP
EE & 0.23, and x
RDP
WEOG & 0.27. Thus, were vot-
ing along regional lines, WEOG would exercise around 5.3 times more voting power than
Africa and the GRULAC (neither of which have any PMs). We compute the uCDPij and
uRDPj using Proposition 3.
3.4 Measuring deviations from equitability
We wish to measure, in an objective sense, the proximity of C2012UNSC to each equity concept.
We therefore adopt as our metric the ‘‘index of distortion’’ used in Felsenthal and
Machover (2004, 2007), and commonly attributed to Loosemore and Hanby (1971). Under
this index, the ‘‘distance’’ between two unit vectors X and Y is given by d(X,Y) =
P
|Xi - Yi|/2 .
Using Definition 2, we define proximity measures on C2012UNSC with respect to our three
equity concepts as
CEsk k ¼ 1EK 0 d vCEs ; kð Þð Þ; CEwk k ¼ 1d vCEw ; kð Þ; REk k ¼ 1dðvRE; kÞ;
where vCEs is the scaled |A| 9 1 unit vector of the vCEsij ; v
CEw , vRE are defined similarly; and
k is the |A| 9 1 unit vector of the constant 1/|A|. Each of these three measures lies on the
23 In this instance, both measures also then correspond to the ‘‘absolute Bz index for ternary voting games’’
of Felsenthal and Machover (1997).
24 In contrast, if all voting possibilities are assumed equally probable, we obtain xPM & 0.10 and
xOM & 0.05, implying that a PM receives almost exactly twice the voting power of a NPM. When, as in
much of the existing literature, the UNSC’s decision rule is modelled as binary then xPM & 0.167 and
xOM & 0.017, which implies that a PM has around ten times more voting power than a NPM.
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Table 2 Relative deviations
Country UC CC
RCEwij RREj RCEwij RREj
Africa – -0.727 – -0.765
Algeria 0.880 – 0.530 –
Angola -0.224 – -0.537 –
Benin -0.242 – -0.692 –
Botswana 0.162 – -0.775 –
Burkina Faso -0.283 – -0.602 –
Burundi -0.644 – -0.859 –
Cameroon -0.601 – -0.759 –
Cape Verde 0.079 – -0.896 –
Central African Republic -0.505 – -0.858 –
Chad -0.839 – -0.926 –
Comoros -0.368 – -0.926 –
Congo 0.780 – -0.511 –
Cote d’Ivoire -0.167 – -0.494 –
Democratic Republic of the
Congo
-0.816 – -0.795 –
Djibouti 0.276 – -0.836 –
Egypt -0.274 – -0.107 –
Equatorial Guinea -0.741 – -0.970 –
Eritrea -0.453 – -0.829 –
Ethiopia -0.622 – -0.530 –
Gabon 1.084 – -0.651 –
Gambia -0.180 – -0.853 –
Ghana 0.229 – -0.171 –
Guinea 0.167 – -0.496 –
Guinea-Bissau -0.628 – -0.938 –
Kenya -0.209 – -0.312 –
Lesotho 0.051 – -0.788 –
Liberia -0.776 – -0.939 –
Libya 0.238 – -0.573 –
Madagascar -0.363 – -0.604 –
Malawi -0.237 – -0.598 –
Mali -0.003 – -0.466 –
Mauritania 0.504 – -0.618 –
Mauritius 0.782 – -0.722 –
Morocco 0.307 – 0.009 –
Mozambique 0.061 – -0.299 –
Namibia 0.434 – -0.704 –
Niger -0.043 – -0.485 –
Nigeria -0.415 – 0.006 –
Rwanda -0.719 – -0.875 –
Sao Tome and Principe -0.111 – -0.951 –
Senegal 0.402 – -0.324 –
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Table 2 continued
Country UC CC
RCEwij RREj RCEwij RREj
Seychelles -0.746 – -0.990 –
Sierra Leone -0.350 – -0.785 –
Somalia -0.728 – -0.886 –
South Africa -0.259 – -0.283 –
South Sudan -0.467 – -0.770 –
Sudan -0.536 – -0.632 –
Swaziland -0.220 – -0.884 –
Togo 0.041 – -0.651 –
Tunisia 0.830 – -0.190 –
Uganda -0.452 – -0.567 –
United Republic of Tanzania -0.092 – -0.181 –
Zambia 0.390 – -0.313 –
Zimbabwe 0.463 – -0.291 –
Asia – -0.371 – 0.067
Afghanistan -0.975 – -0.981 –
Bahrain -0.773 – -0.965 –
Bangladesh -0.679 – -0.466 –
Bhutan -0.939 – -0.993 –
Brunei -0.801 – -0.983 –
Cambodia -0.968 – -0.984 –
China 3.844 – 23.032 –
Cyprus -0.576 – -0.948 –
DPR Korea -0.973 – -0.982 –
Fiji -0.602 – -0.950 –
India -0.212 – 2.768 –
Indonesia -0.625 – -0.207 –
Iran -0.868 – -0.845 –
Iraq -0.903 – -0.925 –
Japan 0.346 – 1.068 –
Jordan 0.030 – -0.650 –
Kazakhstan -0.895 – -0.943 –
Kiribati -0.953 – -0.998 –
Kuwait -0.414 – -0.867 –
Kyrgyzstan -0.977 – -0.993 –
Laos -0.969 – -0.989 –
Lebanon -0.932 – -0.981 –
Malaysia 0.367 – -0.004 –
Maldives -0.918 – -0.994 –
Marshall Islands -0.995 – -1.000 –
Micronesia (Federated States
of)
-0.981 – -0.999 –
Mongolia -0.954 – -0.990 –
Myanmar -0.871 – -0.878 –
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Table 2 continued
Country UC CC
RCEwij RREj RCEwij RREj
Nauru -0.958 – -0.999 –
Nepal -0.832 – -0.875 –
Oman -0.638 – -0.917 –
Pakistan -0.033 – 0.741 –
Palau -0.985 – -1.000 –
Papua New Guinea -0.855 – -0.948 –
Philippines -0.740 – -0.657 –
Qatar -0.359 – -0.884 –
Republic of Korea -0.026 – -0.076 –
Samoa -0.973 – -0.998 –
Saudi Arabia -0.794 – -0.853 –
Singapore 0.469 – -0.547 –
Solomon Islands -0.952 – -0.995 –
Sri Lanka -0.588 – -0.743 –
Syrian Arab Republic -0.936 – -0.960 –
Tajikistan -0.974 – -0.991 –
Thailand -0.651 – -0.603 –
Timor Leste -0.971 – -0.996 –
Tonga -0.967 – -0.999 –
Turkmenistan -0.953 – -0.985 –
Tuvalu -0.968 – -1.000 –
United Arab Emirates -0.167 – -0.688 –
Uzbekistan -0.951 – -0.965 –
Vanuatu -0.972 – -0.998 –
Vietnam -0.939 – -0.922 –
Yemen -0.845 – -0.896 –
EE – 1.156 – 0.613
Albania -0.767 – -0.943 –
Armenia -0.874 – -0.970 –
Azerbaijan -0.596 – -0.832 –
Belarus -0.447 – -0.766 –
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.843 – -0.958 –
Bulgaria -0.517 – -0.819 –
Croatia -0.638 – -0.896 –
Czech Republic 0.015 – -0.551 –
Estonia -0.903 – -0.985 –
Georgia -0.726 – -0.922 –
Hungary 0.239 – -0.465 –
Latvia -0.833 – -0.966 –
Lithuania -0.760 – -0.940 –
Montenegro -0.962 – -0.996 –
Poland 1.568 – 1.171 –
Republic of Moldova -0.730 – -0.930 –
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Table 2 continued
Country UC CC
RCEwij RREj RCEwij RREj
Romania 0.453 – -0.080 –
Russian Federation 13.709 – 23.032 –
Serbia -0.457 – -0.799 –
Slovakia -0.584 – -0.867 –
Slovenia -0.768 – -0.955 –
TFYR Macedonia -0.822 – -0.965 –
Ukraine 0.865 – 0.718 –
GRULAC – -0.639 – -0.698
Antigua and Barbuda -0.939 – -0.998 –
Argentina 0.703 – 0.479 –
Bahamas -0.599 – -0.968 –
Barbados -0.857 – -0.990 –
Belize -0.788 – -0.984 –
Bolivia -0.825 – -0.925 –
Brazil 0.779 – 2.393 –
Chile 0.545 – -0.127 –
Colombia 0.007 – -0.064 –
Costa Rica -0.554 – -0.868 –
Cuba -0.495 – -0.768 –
Dominica -0.992 – -1.000 –
Dominican Republic -0.624 – -0.838 –
Ecuador -0.252 – -0.611 –
El Salvador -0.900 – -0.966 –
Grenada -0.993 – -1.000 –
Guatemala -0.781 – -0.887 –
Guyana -0.216 – -0.907 –
Haiti -0.990 – -0.996 –
Honduras -0.573 – -0.839 –
Jamaica -0.612 – -0.912 –
Mexico 0.845 – 1.685 –
Nicaragua -0.763 – -0.922 –
Panama -0.607 – -0.899 –
Paraguay -0.747 – -0.912 –
Peru -0.281 – -0.470 –
Saint Kitts and Nevis -0.995 – -1.000 –
Saint Lucia -0.936 – -0.996 –
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
-0.984 – -0.999 –
Suriname -0.857 – -0.986 –
Trinidad and Tobago -0.370 – -0.900 –
Uruguay 0.176 – -0.705 –
Venezuela 2.329 – 1.449 –
WEOG – 0.582 – 0.783
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unit interval, with unity indicating maximal proximity, and zero indicating the minimum
possible proximity.
To gain further insight, we decompose the proximity measures for CEw and RE by
country (Table 2). Specifically, we report individual relative deviations, R, from these
equity concepts as25:
Table 2 continued
Country UC CC
RCEwij RREj RCEwij RREj
Andorra -0.974 – -0.999 –
Australia -0.635 – -0.764 –
Austria 1.943 – 0.165 –
Belgium -0.062 – -0.580 –
Canada -0.177 – -0.344 –
Denmark 0.341 – -0.568 –
Finland 0.085 – -0.656 –
France 20.859 – 23.032 –
Germany 1.373 – 1.942 –
Greece -0.801 – -0.909 –
Iceland -0.977 – -0.998 –
Ireland 0.566 – -0.548 –
Israel -0.972 – -0.990 –
Italy 0.617 – 0.720 –
Liechtenstein -0.966 – -0.999 –
Luxembourg -0.958 – -0.996 –
Malta -0.931 – -0.994 –
Monaco -0.960 – -0.999 –
Netherlands 0.439 – -0.199 –
New Zealand -0.304 – -0.801 –
Norway 0.051 – -0.683 –
Portugal -0.299 – -0.687 –
San Marino -0.976 – -0.999 –
Spain 0.319 – 0.224 –
Sweden 0.335 – -0.441 –
Switzerland 0.288 – -0.513 –
Turkey 0.875 – 1.186 –
United Kingdom 21.329 – 23.032 –
United States of America 8.982 – 23.032 –
25 An analogous relative deviation from strong country EVP is given by
RCEsij ¼ EK 0 vCEsijk  EA vCEsijk
 
=EA v
CEs
ijk
 n o
. This measure considers the absolute value of deviations from
the mean such that positive and negative deviations do not offset over time. As, however, we observe a high
degree of correlation between RCEsij and the absolute value of RCEwij across countries we choose, in the
interest of brevity, to omit the results for RCEsij .
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RCEwij ¼ EK 0
vCEsijk  EA vCEsijk
 
EA v
CEs
ijk
 
0
@
1
A; RREij ¼
vREij  EA vREij
 
EA vREij
  :
3.5 Results
Our proximity measures under UC preferences are found as
CEsk k ¼ 0:38; CEwk k ¼ 0:51; REk k ¼ 0:65:
The maximum deviation is observed to be from strong country EVP. Part of this
inequity owes to the two-year term length of a NPM, which implies that countries half-way
through their terms are assigned to the UNSC with probability one (and thereby wield too
much expected voting power in that year). A second explanatory factor is the rule that
prevents NPMs from running for immediate reelection, which implies that countries at the
end of their terms as NPMs receive an assignment probability of zero (and thereby wield
too little expected voting power in that year). As these two factors go in different direc-
tions, deviations from equitability offset each other partially over time: comparing ||CEs||
with ||CEw|| we see that around 23 % of all deviations from strong country EVP are offset
in this way. The equity concept closest to being met is RE, suggesting that the UNSC is
more equitable from a regional perspective than from a country perspective.
3.5.1 Country equity
To delve deeper, we now consider the individual country relative deviations reported in
Table 2, beginning with an analysis of country-level equity in the UNSC. As seen in the
first column of the table, far too much expected voting power is given to citizens of PM
countries. On average (i.e., under weak country EVP) the United Kingdom wields some
21.3 times its equitable level of expected voting power, and even China wields around 3.8
times too much expected voting power. Why are the PMs so heavily overrepresented? Part
of the answer lies in the observation that a PM’s veto right gives it more voting power than
a NPM. This effect, however, is compounded by a second effect that arises from the fact
that a PM always is able to cast a vote on the UNSC, whereas an OM can do so only
periodically. Existing approaches to assessing the equitability of the UNSC via the ratio
xPM=xOM miss entirely this second effect.
Ordinary members suffer a collective deficit of expected voting power. Only a small
proportion of such members exceed their equitable expected voting power under CEw, and
the largest individual deviations are for members that receive too little expected voting
power. For instance, under the estimated assignment probabilities in Table 1, Dominica
receives just 0.8 % of its equitable expected voting power. In other regions, countries such
as Chad (16.1 %), Samoa (2.7 %), Montenegro (3.8 %) and Liechtenstein (3.4 %) also
receive much too little expected voting power.
In summary, the current UNSC deviates significantly from country level equitability,
and deviations from CEw in any single year will tend to be significantly more pronounced
than the average deviation over time. The fundamental problem is that PMs enjoy the
greatest voting power and the largest assignment probabilities, whereas, under country
EVP, these margins should be traded-off. From this perspective, the long-term goal of
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reform proposals in respect of the PMs must therefore be to either end their veto rights, end
their right to be ever-present on the UNSC, or some combination of the two. Note,
however, that our equity measures would permit a PM to exercise a veto when a UNSC
member if they were willing to sacrifice sufficient assignment probability. Thus, there is
nothing inherent in our country equity concept that supports the abolition of the veto.26 If
retaining the right of veto, CEw would obtain for China if it were represented on the UNSC
in around 24 of every 100 years. The United States would qualify for membership under
CEw in only around 12 years in every 100, while the United Kingdom and France would
qualify for membership in only around six. On the other hand, in return for receiving the
voting power of an OM only, CEw would obtain for India if it were represented in around
76 of every 100 years.
The reason that the above insights are relevant just to the long-term is the impracticality
of short- or even medium-term reforms affecting the existing PMs. No PM is willing to
relinquish either its right of veto, or its right to be ever present, and the constitutional
ability of the PMs to retain these powers seems impregnable.27 Short-term reform pro-
posals, therefore, seek to extend the right of veto and/or the right to be ever-present on the
Council (Cox 2009). The ‘‘winners’’ of such reforms become overrepresented, however,
while the underrepresentation of the many ‘‘losers’’ is exacerbated. Accordingly, as a
means of compensating the ‘‘losers’’, reform proposals typically also allow for some
expansion of the council’s membership. While a full quantitative appraisal of the (many)
reform proposals of this type to date is beyond the scope of this study, we show in a
companion paper (Gould and Rablen 2014) that they generate always modest, and
sometimes negative, net improvements in our measures of equity. Thus, those hoping for a
step-change in the equitability of the UNSC in the short-term are likely to be disappointed.
3.5.2 Regional equity
We now analyze the UNSC from a regional perspective using the region equity concept
(the second column of Table 2). Africa is the most underrepresented region, with only
about 28 % of its equitable voting power, Latin America has 36 %, and Asia 63 %. At the
other end of the spectrum, EE and the WEOG are overrepresented. EE receives just over
double its equitable voting power, making it the most overrepresented region.
These results imply the existence of substantial inequity between the north—defined in
Zifcak (2006, footnote 9) as comprising EE and the WEOG—and the south (Africa, Asia
and the GRULAC). If UNSC voting were along north–south lines, the ratio of bloc voting
powers in the council would be exactly 1:1. As, however, the south is more populous, RE
requires that it receive more voting power than the north. Accordingly, the south achieves
just 63 % of its equitable voting power. Therefore, the regional equity concepts advocate
that voting power should be shifted away from EE and the WEOG, and towards Africa,
Asia and the GRULAC.
An approach to reform of the UNSC that could address these regional imbalances in
representation effectively is to alter the allocation of NPM seats between regions (possibly
in conjunction with an increase in the total number of NPMs). Our regional equity concept
is not prescriptive in this regard, however, as only the voting power of the regional bloc
26 For an alternative analysis of the veto from the perspective of bargaining theory, see Winter (1996).
27 The San Francisco Declaration of 1945 ensures that a PM can veto questions of veto rights, for a PM
exercises a veto on all non-procedural matters and also on whether a matter is to be deemed procedural or
non-procedural (see, e.g., Gross 1953).
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matters, so, for a given bloc voting power, the number of countries that form the bloc is
irrelevant. Strong country EVP is prescriptive in this regard, however.
Proposition 4 If C2012UNSC satisfies strong country EVP then nj /
P
aij2Rj
ﬃﬃﬃ
qij
p
xCDP
ij
for all j.
The proof of Proposition 4 first establishes that, under the assumptions of this appli-
cation, strong EVP implies pijk / ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqijp =xCDPij . Then, as must be true by construction,P
aij2Rj pijk = nj and the Proposition follows. According to Proposition 4, the (approxi-
mate) optimal nj for the current 15-member UNSC would be: 5.5 members from Asia, four
members from Africa, two members from each of the GRULAC and the WEOG, and 1.5
members from EE.28 Thus the WEOG, with four seats in the present UNSC, has twice its
entitlement under CEs, while Asia and Africa—which both receive three seats—are
underrepresented, in Asia’s case by close to one-half.
From a reform perspective, Proposition 4 suggests that NPM seats should be reallocated
away from WEOG towards Africa and Asia (or, that any expansion of the UNSC be
suitably tilted towards Africa and Asia). While, again, a detailed analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, we show in Gould and Rablen (2014) that existing reform proposals do
not reap the full equity benefits available from expanding the Council, as the proposed
allocation of new NPM seats is tilted insufficiently in favor of Africa and Asia.
3.6 Preference correlation
We now briefly consider alternative a priori assumptions regarding preference correlation
for the UNSC. We note that country behavior suggests very weak a priori grounds for
considering RC preferences. For instance, countries on the UNSC do seem to act as distinct
entities within regions. Each council member has full sovereignty over how it votes and
countries pour large sums of money into campaigns for election to the UNSC (e.g., Malone
2000), suggesting that they do not perceive membership by another country in their region
to be a perfect (or even a good) substitute for their own membership. Also, the voting
behavior in the UNGA of serving members of the UNSC is no more similar to that of their
regional members than to the votes of the remaining UNGA members (Lai and Lefler
2009). With the exception of the WEOG—whose composition partly reflects that of the
British Commonwealth (Daws 1999)—the regional groups are not self-selected, but
determined solely by an exogenous factor in geographic location. Accordingly, we shall
discuss only the case of CC preferences.
For CC preferences the TMT rule specified in Sect. 3.2 cannot be employed in the
context of the RDP, for it does not satisfy anonymity for all regional citizens.29 A simple
way to permit an analysis of regional equity in this case is to define a counterpart TMT rule
at the level of countries—the ‘‘Country TMT’’ (CTMT) rule. For brevity, when the citizens
of country i vote x unanimously, we say that ‘‘country i voted x’’. Under the CTMT rule,
for the regional outcome to be ‘‘mandate for’’, (i) more countries must vote ‘‘for’’ than vote
‘‘against’’; and (ii) at least a proportion s[ 0 of all countries must vote ‘‘for’’. A
28 Here the fractional Asia and EE membership would be achieved by alternating between (i) Asia having
six seats, and EE one; and (ii) Asia having five seats and EE two.
29 To see this point, note that the stage 1 regional election would see bloc voting among the citizens of each
country, but with each bloc voting independently. In this case, within a region, the TMT rule gives more
voting power to the citizens of a more populous country than to the citizens of a less populous country.
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symmetric condition applies for ‘‘mandate against’’ to obtain, with ‘‘no mandate’’
obtaining in all other eventualities. For comparability, we again assume s = 1/3.
Using the above approach, the proximity measures for CC preferences are found as:
CEsk k ¼ 0:24; CEwk k ¼ 0:31; REk k ¼ 0:71:
Country equity falls in comparison to the results under UC preferences. In the third
column of Table 2, we see that the least populous countries warrant larger expected voting
powers under CC preferences than they do under UC preferences, whereas the most
populous countries (including the PMs) warrant lesser expected voting powers. Accord-
ingly, the least populous countries become even more heavily underrepresented, while the
PMs become even more heavily overrepresented.
Proximity to RE is, however, improved under CC preferences. This arises as, under UC
preferences, regional equity in the UNSC requires that voting power reflect (inversely) the
population of each region. This results in inequity as the regions vary greatly in population,
while voting power in the UNSC is relatively flat across regional blocs. Under CC pref-
erences, however, regional equity in the UNSC requires that voting power reflect the
number of countries in each region. This reduces inequity as there is less variability across
regions in the number of countries per region than in the regional populations.
4 Conclusion
The councils of the United Nations play important roles in upholding global wealth, health,
law and security. Yet, to our knowledge, no previous analysis has developed formal equity
principles for the analysis of such bodies, in which only a subset of members may vote at a
point in time. We formulate democratic equity concepts for such bodies in a new class of
voting game we term a council voting game. In particular, we develop separate notions of
equity for such games at both the country and region levels.
We demonstrate the utility of our theoretical framework with an application to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We find that significant degrees of inequity exist
in the long-run average levels of representation across countries, and that these deviations
from long-run equitability typically are exacerbated in any single iteration of the UNSC
viewed in isolation. Exploiting our distinction between country and regional notions of
equity, we also find that the UNSC is more inequitable if its members are viewed as
representing only themselves, than if they are viewed as representing their region as a
whole. We emphasize that, in our framework, the excessive representation of the UNSC’s
permanent members (PMs) derives from their right to be ever-present on the UNSC, not
only from their right of veto. Our measure of regional equity suggests that Africa (not Asia)
is the most heavily underrepresented region, while Eastern (not Western) Europe is the
most heavily overrepresented region.
What do our findings imply for the ongoing debate on UNSC reform? First, we believe
our framework clarifies the nature of the underlying tradeoffs. Simultaneous achievement
of country and regional equity is infeasible and, for the time-being at least, realpolitik rules
out the types of reforms needed to address the overrepresentation of the permanent
members. Second, our analysis highlights that, in the long-run, reform of the UNSC must
address not only the distribution of voting power, but also the distribution of assignment
probabilities.
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The apparent tension between realpolitik and the equity concepts we develop suggests
that the latter should be understood purely as normative benchmarks against which to
assess the equitability of alternative reform possibilities. An avenue for future research
might, therefore, be to investigate ‘‘second-best’’ designs that minimize deviations from
our equity concepts under an additional realpolitik constraint. While this idea must await a
proper treatment, we hope the present contribution marks a first step in the normative
analysis of democratic equitability in councils.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Under the CDP, and assuming UC preferences, we have
vCEsijk ¼ uCDPij pijkxCDPij . To equalize vCEsijk across world citizens there must exist a k[ 0 such
that xCDPij ¼ k= pijkuCDPij
 
, which is equivalent to the statement in the Proposition. Parts
(ii) and (iii) follow from similar reasoning.
h
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Under the CDP, and assuming CC preferences, we have
vCEsijk ¼ uCDPpijkxCDPij . To equalize vCEsijk across world citizens there must exist a k[ 0 such
that xCDPij ¼ k=pijk, which is equivalent to the statement in the Proposition. Parts (ii) and
(iii) follow from similar reasoning.
h
Proof of Proposition 3 Citizen i is ‘‘critical’’ when, by reducing his/her support for the
motion by one level, the voting outcome is changed. Citizen i is critical in the stage 1 vote
under the TMT rule when any of the following holds:
Forj j ¼ Againstj j and Abstainj j\q
3
;
Forj j ¼ Againstj j þ 1 and Abstainj j\q
3
;
Forj j ¼ Againstj j  1 and Abstainj j\q
3
;
Forj j ¼ q
3
 
and Againstj j\q
3
;
Forj j\q
3
and Againstj j ¼ q
3
 
:
ðA:1Þ
Thus, under the ‘‘uniform numeric evaluation’’ of Freixas (2005a), citizen i is critical if,
when changing his/her vote from ‘‘for’’ to ‘‘abstain’’ or from ‘‘abstain’’ to ‘‘against’’, the
outcome of the vote also is changed in the same direction. Under the first condition in
(A.1), if citizen i votes ‘‘for’’ the outcome is ‘‘mandate for’’, if citizen i votes ‘‘against’’ the
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outcome is ‘‘mandate against’’, and if citizen i votes ‘‘abstain’’ the outcome is ‘‘no man-
date’’. In this case citizen i is critical when changing his/her vote from ‘‘for’’ to ‘‘abstain’’
or from ‘‘abstain’’ to ‘‘against’’, leading to an overall contribution to the Banzhaf score of
two for votes satisfying this condition. Under the second condition, if citizen i votes ‘‘for’’
or ‘‘abstain’’ the outcome is ‘‘no mandate’’, and if citizen i votes ‘‘against’’ the outcome is
‘‘mandate against’’. Hence, this instance of criticality contributes one to the Banzhaf score.
Similarly, under the third condition citizen i can change the result to ‘‘mandate against’’
from ‘‘no mandate’’. Again it contributes one. Under the fourth condition, if citizen i votes
‘‘against’’ or ‘‘abstain’’ the outcome is ‘‘no mandate’’, and if citizen i votes ‘‘for’’ the
outcome is ‘‘mandate for’’. Hence this contributes one towards the Banzhaf score. The fifth
condition contributes one in the same way as the fourth.
Define i.i.d. random variables Xi, i = 1,2…,q by:
Xi xð Þ ¼
1 if x ¼ For;
0 if x ¼ Abstain;
1 if x ¼ Against;
8
<
:
where Pr(x = For) = Pr(x = Abstain) = Pr(x = Against) = 1/3. Then we have
E(Xi) = 0 and Var(Xi) = 2/3, where Xi represents the vote of citizen i in stage 1. Construct
another random variable Xq ¼Pqk¼1 Xk  Xi, which represents the possible votes from an
electorate of size q, excluding the vote of citizen i. Xq takes integer values corresponding to
the difference between the number of ‘‘for’’ and ‘‘against’’ votes, (excluding i’s vote). Then
lq = E(X
q) = 0 and (rq)
2 = Var(Xq) = 2(q - 1)/3. Let / denote the density function of
the standard normal distribution. By application of the local central limit theorem (see, e.g.,
Petrov 1975, Theorem 1) we obtain:
Pr Forj j ¼ Againstj jð Þ ¼Pr Xq ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
rq
/
0 lq
rq
	 

 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 q  1ð Þ p=3p ;
Pr Forj j ¼ Againstj j þ 1ð Þ ¼Pr Xq ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
rq
/
1 lq
rq
	 

 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 q  1ð Þ p=3p ;
Pr Forj j ¼ Againstj j  1ð Þ ¼Pr Xq ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 1
rq
/
1 lq
rq
	 

 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 q  1ð Þ p=3p ;
where * denotes asymptotic equivalence. The probabilities Pr Forj j ¼ q=3b cð Þ and
Pr Againstj j ¼ q=3b cð Þ cannot be computed from Xq as given above. For these we consider
the random variables Yi and Zi:
Yi xð Þ ¼
2
3
if x ¼ For;
1
3
if x ¼ Abstain or Against;

Zi xð Þ ¼
2
3
if x ¼ Against;
1
3
if x ¼ For or Abstain;

and construct Yq and Zq in the same manner as Xq. We compute the (common) mean and
variance of these random variables to be ~lq = E(Y
q) = E(Zq) = 0 and
~rq
 2
= Var(Yq) = Var(Zq) = 2(q - 1)/9. Applying the local central limit theorem in a
manner similar to above we find that
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Pr Forj j ¼ q
3
j k 
 Pr Yq ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
~rq
u
0 ~lq
~rq
	 

 3ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 q  1ð Þpp ;
Pr Againstj j ¼ q
3
j k 
 Pr Zq ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 1
~rq
u
0 ~lq
~rq
	 

 3ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4 q  1ð Þpp :
Notice that Pr(|For| = |Against| and |Abstain|\ q/3) = Pr(|For| = |Against| and |Ab-
stain| C q/3) and therefore Pr(|For| = |Against| and |Abstain|\ q/3) = Pr(|For| =
|Against|)/2, with similar equivalences holding for the remaining conditions in (A.1). Then
u q;1=3ð Þ¼ 4Pr Forj j ¼ Againstj jand Abstainj j\q
3
 
þ2Pr Forj j ¼ q
3
j k
and Againstj j\q
3
 
 1
2
4
2
1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4ðq1Þp=3p þ
1
2
2
2
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4ðq1Þpp 
3þ2 ﬃﬃﬃ3p
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qp
p
h
Proof of Proposition 4 From Proposition 1, strong country EVP holds if and only if
pijkxCDPij / 1=uCDPij . From Proposition 3, uCDPij / 1= ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqijp holds under the specification of
C2012UNSC, so strong country EVP holds in this game if pijk / ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃqijp =xCDPij for all aij. Then, asP
aij2Rj pijk ¼ nj by construction, it must hold that nj /
P
aij2Rj
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
qij
p
=xCDPij for all j.
h
Simulation model
We compute a set of pijk and a finite-sample estimate of the pij from the realization (by
computer simulation) of C2012UNSC over the finite set of motions K0 = {k1,…,k100,000}. Pre-
cisely, we realize slightly more than 100,000 periods, but discard the very earliest periods.
This is necessary as we begin with a UNSC containing the five PMs and ten vacant seats. In
each period we elect five new NPMs, hence, it is not until the completion of the election in
period two that no vacant seats remain on the elected UNSC. We discard the first four
periods as, in all periods beyond the fourth, the elected UNSC contains no vacant seats, and
eligibility for election to the UNSC does not depend upon whether a country was elected to
the UNSC in either of periods one or two.
We follow the actual timing of UNSC elections: the term of the single EE NPM begins
in even years; the two NPMs of the WEOG begin their terms in odd years; and the terms
for the two NPMs of the GRULAC are staggered; one is elected each year. Asia’s two
NPM seats are staggered similarly. The three Africa NPM seats likewise are staggered with
two terms beginning in even years and one term beginning in odd years. In practice, the
UNGA elects OMs to the UNSC simultaneously when it must choose more than one NPM
from the same region in a given year. For the purposes of developing a tractable simulation
model, however, we suppose that, in this circumstance, countries are elected sequentially,
one-by-one. Hence, if two seats are to be assigned to members of region j, then, in each of
two rounds, a new realization of a random variable is drawn such that, if all countries in the
region are competing for the seat, country aij is elected with probability qij. Because,
however, UNSC’s rules prohibit countries from having dual membership, if the same
country is elected in both rounds the result is annulled and the process repeated again in
full. This continues until distinct countries are elected.
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Thus, in a given year, a first set of countries, those halfway through their two-year term,
gain automatic renewal of their NPM status in the following year (Yk); a second set of
countries, Ik, are those ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (UNSC
rules prohibit NPMs from seeking immediate reelection); and a final set of countries is
eligible for election to the UNSC (Ek). Hence, we can write
pijk
¼ 0
2 0; 1ð Þ
¼ 1
if aij 2 Ik;
if aij 2 Ek;
if aij 2 Yk:
8
<
:
For aij [ Ek, let pzijk denote pijk when z NPM seats are being elected in region j, in which
case
p0ijk ¼ 0; p1ijk ¼
qijP
aij2Ejk qij
; p2ijk ¼
2p1ijk 1 p1ijk
 
1Paij2Ejk p1ijk
 2
Note that the numerator of p2ijk is the binomial probability of observing a distinct country
pair containing aij, and that the denominator corrects for the impossibility of a country
obtaining dual UNSC membership. To compute unbiased estimates of the pij we then
simply observe the proportion of the 100,000 motions for which aij [ M (see Table 1).
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